AN IMPETUOUS DEPLOYMENT REVEALS THE CONSTRAINTS ON BRITISH MILITARY ACTION

Editorial of "The Independent", del 20-11-01

Con un  breve comentario al final (L. B.-B.)

The position of the 100 Special Boat Service marines occupying the Bagram airbase outside Kabul grows more precarious by the hour. The intention, to secure a vital facility so that humanitarian and military supplies could be quickly moved into the area, may have been a laudable one, but the execution has been dreadfully botched. Why deploy such a small force without first ensuring that substantial reinforcements could be quickly moved in, and that there was political support for this potentially dangerous action? Instead, the marines are surrounded and hugely outnumbered by the soldiers of the Northern Alliance. There is even the possibility that they will soon be forced into an ignominious withdrawal. It appears that Tony Blair was rather impetuous when he ordered in British forces.

The situation at Bagram illustrates starkly that the constraints on any British action are as much political and diplomatic as they are military – and that they are much tighter than Mr Blair anticipated. His spokesmen have given the impression over the past few days that they intended to see the several thousand British troops now on standby deployed to Afghanistan as quickly as possible, with a second batch arriving yesterday. Instead, these soldiers remain on alert at home, unsure of their mission, and Mr Blair has been forced on to the back foot over his soldiers' deployment.

In his statement to the Commons last week, the Prime Minister rightly said that British forces would only be used for as long as it took for an international force to be assembled. Mr Blair also identified some clear tasks for British forces on the ground – securing routes of supply for humanitarian aid, clearing unexploded ordnance, especially mines and cluster bombs, and the protection of aid workers and other NGO personnel. But all that depends on the "goodwill" of the Northern Alliance, a scarce commodity at the best of times. So far the Alliance seems willing to acquiesce. But extending our role into the sphere of "peace-keeping" and occupying important installations such as the Bagram airbase depends crucially on our making the case to the various anti-Taliban forces that a new "Marshall Plan" for their country and taking part in a broad-based government is a better bet for them than more war. For while peace-keeping may be possible, peace-making in Afghanistan is not an achievable aim in the short term.

This in turn requires the Bush administration to commit itself to a burden it seems surprisingly unwilling to shoulder. Fortunately, Mr Blair has one overwhelmingly powerful argument on his side. As he often points out, the reason why the Taliban regime was able to establish itself and foster al-Qa'ida was because the West so abruptly abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation. After 11 September, America cannot take the risk of that happening again.

Even if Britain wanted to, it cannot take over all the functions of government in Afghanistan. Neither can the UN. It may be possible, just, to do so in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor but, scarred as they are, none of the those territories is as badly damaged or as dangerous or as vast as Afghanistan. We have witnessed at Bagram the limits of what can be accomplished without a proper framework. Britain can help rebuild the country and we can encourage the new Afghan government to uphold the rule of law, respect human rights and to liberate women, and we can have a UN force that monitors the situation.

In other words, a coalition of the willing carrying out tasks that are possible is the best that can be hoped for in Afghanistan. That is a role for our armed forces that we should be proud to see them perform.

BREVE COMENTARIO (L. B.-B.)

Si se quiere estabilizar Afganistán y Pakistán es imprescindible la formación de un gobierno equilibrado de amplia base y la participación de todas las etnias en el proceso de transición y reconstrucción del país. Pero eso no se dará si la única fuerza militar organizada es la del Frente Unido. Si los pastunes quedan sometidos a la hegemonía militar y política del Frente Unido y/o descolgados de las instituciones centrales , la guerra de guerrillas de los talibán será mucho más potente y duradera, la inestabilidad de Afganistán se hará permanente y la desestabilización de Pakistán hacia el integrismo resultará el efecto inmediato. Es mucho lo que está en juego en este punto de partida.

Por ello, el respaldo militar de la coalición internacional a un nuevo gobierno de integración es vital y urgente, y se hace preciso convencer de ello a Rusia, Irán y el Frente Unido, que no debe asumir ahora un papel que no le corresponde. La coalición internacional desequilibró la situación a  favor de éste, y no se le puede pedir ahora a aquélla que se retraiga irresponsablemente. Es necesario finalizar la guerra y mantener el equilibrio del país, sin que se produzca una hegemonía artificial, falsa e inestable que vuelva a conducir a Afganistán a la anarquía y a la guerra civil entre facciones militares y étnicas.

Lo ideal sería una fuerza multinacional de control bajo la dirección de la Onu ya desde ahora, pero eso da la impresión de que va para largo, además de que la perduración de la guerra lo hace difícil. Por ello,  la necesidad de un reequilibrio militar es urgente e inmediata, así como la desmilitarización del país cuando el régimen talibán se derrumbe. EEUU,Gran Bretaña,  Francia, Alemania, Italia, España y, si lo desea, Rusia, deberían enviar inmediatamente fuerzas militares a Afganistán que ayudaran a finalizar la guerra, iniciaran la prestación de ayuda humanitaria y llenaran el vacío de seguridad que el derrumbe del régimen talibán y la heterogeneidad del Frente Unido  van a crear. Una vez estabilizada la situación, debería ser la fuerza multinacional creada por las Naciones Unidas quien asumiera el control.

EEUU debería ser muy consciente de esta necesidad: parece ser la única manera de reenderezar la situación de Afganistán y Pakistán en la dirección correcta, a fin de crear una estabilidad en esa zona en el medio plazo.